A study of Early Achaemenid Infantry

 

Early Achaemenid Infantry

 

The classification of the infantry of the Achaemenid Empire up to and including their failed invasion of Greece (480-479bc) has always been a bit of a puzzle. Partly, as always for ancient armies, it is due to lack of information. This style of fighting declined after these wars, no doubt because it was proven to be inferior to the Greek hoplite style, and Greeks became much sought after as mercenaries by the Persians. The closest ancient source we have for the battles of the time is Herodotus; however he wrote his Histories 50 years after the battle of Plataea (479bc) so at best he would have spoken to old soldiers who had been at the battle. There are other ancient authors who cover the Persian army of the period, but they are by definition secondary sources, as they were all born after this style of fighting had disappeared. While the literary sources are limited, there are good sources in the ceramics of the time and archeological work.

 

Sources

I’ve based this study on three modern works on the subject:

 

Shadows in the Desert, Ancient Persia at War by Dr Kaveh Farrokh (Osprey, 2007).

In the Name of the Shah, Achaemenid Persia at War, David Marlowe (2018)

The Armies and Enemies of Ancient Persia (English translation) Dr Marek Wozniak (Winged Hussar, 2019)

 

Farrokh’s work is a good general history from the origins of the Persian people through to the Sassanian (and post Sassanian) period. Of necessity it has to be brief on each period. Marlowe and Wosniak are more detailed, and refer back to the main ancient and modern authors on this army.

 

Organisation

Little solid is known about the infantry at the start of the Persian empire. Xenophon covers this in his Cyropadeia but is writing centuries after the event. He talks of archers and slingers forming the centre of the army together with infantry armed with short sword and spears. It’s unclear to be honest whether he is just making it up based on the troops of his day or not.

As in so many armies, the Persian army was rooted in what preceded them. The Scythian tribes of the steppes mingled with Assyrian traditions and produced first the Mede army and then the closely related Persian military. In the Early Achaemenid infantry there are echoes of Assyrian siege reliefs and Scythian grave goods.

 

The Persian army of this period was organized on a decimal basis. The smallest element was ten men, one of whom would be an officer. Ten of these formed a unit of 100, and ten of those a unit of 1,000. The unit of 1,000 – Hazarabam – seems the smallest tactical unit mentioned in ancient sources. These were brought together into units of 10,000 – the Baivarabam – which seems to have been the main building block of the army. Each unit (which I’ll call a corps from now on) of 10,000 would usually consist of a single nationality. Even closely related peoples like the Persian and Medes would not be mixed but would have their own units.

 

Fighting Style.

The Persian empire was a sprawling one with each satrapy having a degree of autonomy. Many satrapies had their own fighting style. However there was for several satrapies a common way of fighting, which Herodotus called “in the Persian style” and wargamers have come to call “sparabara”. This style was used (amongst others) by the Persian, Mede, Kassite, Hyrcanians and Immortals. It may have been used in most of the 30 odd army corps as Herodotus gives a brief description of them only and focusses on their differences to add colour to his narrative.

So what is the Persian style? The most noticeable feature for the wargamer is the big willow spara rectangular shield at the front of the formation There are lots of artistic depictions of this from Greek art. There’s also quite similar shields shown at the front of infantry formations in Assyrian reliefs and a similar shied has been found in a Scythian grave barrow. These were about 1.4-1.5m (4.5 to 5 feet) high and about 60cm wide (2 feet). They were set at a slight angle and braced by a supporting strut. It’s unclear whether the shields were placed individually or were tied together in some way. Herodotus mentioned that the Persians “formed them into a barricade” so some sort of tying together was likely. The shields were clearly meant as a barrier, certainly to missiles and from Herodotus’ description they helped when enemy closed to contact. Since such shields could only offer proper protection if side by side, their dimensions also give us the width of each file – 60cm (2 feet). This is a very dense formation – these were close formation heavy foot. The spara was carried into battle most likely by the officer of a file of ten men, and he was the sparabara (literally “shield bearer”).

It’s tempting to assume that the formation was ten ranks deep, given the decimal organization. The reality is we don’t really know. Herodotus tells us that at Plataea the Persians facing the Spartans were drawn up in greater depth than usual (so perhaps 20 deep to maximise the arrow storm).

What of the troops standing behind the sparabara? They were generally armed with both short spear and bow. The ones at the front would presumably be the best archers as they could see to aim and the rear ranks couldn’t. In the defeat at Plataea Herodotus says the Persians were deficient in armour, training and skill. The first is clearly true; they had no greaves and no helmets. The latter two presumably means skill and training in hand to hand combat compared to the Spartans. Herodotus says they had light wicker shields. Other than the spara, there are several types of shield depicted in art. The Persepolis reliefs show the violin shaped diplyon shields. They may have had the round or crescent shaped taka shield (though most depictions of this are slightly later). Some art shows, rather than a shield, a cloth wound round the left arm.

The Greek wars were the beginning of the end of the sparabara system. It may still have been in use at Cunaxa in 401bc but the Persians preferred to hire Greek mercenary hoplites, or Persian kardaka hoplites I those were not available.

 

 

The Immortals and other Guard units.

The Immortals were the senior corps of the Persian army; kept up to 10,000 strength by promotions from other units of the Persian army. They seem to have used the same sparabara system as the rest of the Persian contingents. They stood out by using spears with silver pomegranates on the butt end (gold for the officers). There was also a unit of 1,000 infantry with apples on the butt end of the spear, who seem to have been nobles as the personal guard of the king of kings. They may or may not have used the sparabara formation.  

 

Numbers

While ancient sources seem to routinely ascribe varied but usually vast numbers to the Persian host (Herodotus has 1.7m men in the army that invaded Greece), they are reasonably aligned on the native Persian component of the army. The native Persian troops were known as Kardaka – most likely for Old Persian “Kara” – “army” and “war” ( and Strabo gives Carda as ‘the manly and warlike spirit). Xenophon in his Cyropaedia says “there are about 120,000 Persians” – perhaps total native army strength, and possibly including Medes as well as Persians. Quintus Curtius Rufus has the Persian army at 100,000 (of which 30,000 cavalry) before Issus. Arrian Gives Persian troops at Issus as 30,000 right wing cavalry, 60,000 Kardaka armed as hoplites and 20,000 light armed in a screen for a total of 110,000. Cornelius Nepos mentions a force of 20,000 cavalry and 100,00 infantry in 367bc. Since the sources are in good agreement, it seems the Persian contingent of the army would be somewhere between 100,000 and 120,000, with 30,000 of those being cavalry.

 

Herodotus gives us a good review of the army of Xerxes invading Greece. There were 30 corps of infantry. One of these was the Immortals but the core of the army seems to have been the sparabara units “fighting in the Persian style”. There is some suggestion in the sources (based I think on records in the Egyptian satrapy?) that while the theory was that the corps were 10,000 strong, this only really applied for the heart of the army, and that some of the more provincial satrapies supplied less. In the invasion of Greece period, there’s also an issue that, while the King of Kings seemed to want to have representation from all parts of the empire, the practicalities of supply were such that the most effective troops were prioritized, along with Medizing Greeks. Hence the ‘also ran’ nations would probably been in much smaller numbers than the main “Persian style” troops.

 

Implications for Rules

 

The Sparabara system provided a solid block of close order archers with a frontal spara defence. It should be good against incoming shooting, and the protection of the spara might mean that the Persians are able to shoot better for lack of incoming missiles. They should be depicted as bow and light spear and light shield.

The normal depth for the formation is probably 10 deep, though it could be 20 if needed. The volume of arrows put out should slow down Greek hoplites but Spartans and Athenians if deep enough were able to get through with some difficulty. Though note the thin Athenian centre at Marathon was broken by it. That sounds to me to be effective shooting with bases two deep, but perhaps if four deep the shooting could be a tad better.

In close combat the spara wall clearly gave some benefit to the Persian defenders. We only have evidence of its effect against infantry, but the volume of arrows plus the physical barrier sounds like a problem for enemy cavalry as well.

It is clear that once the spara wall was down, the Persians were much more vulnerable. Ideally there would be a system that once the Persians suffer a bad combat result the spara wall is destroyed and the Persians are then on worse factors. Or have it that the Persians do well at the first shock of combat, but lose the benefit in future rounds.

In terms of movement, once the spara wall was up there doesn’t seem to have been any. It becomes a stationary shooting platform. I imaging if the enemy retreated it would be possible to disassemble the wall and move forward. This strikes me as similar to the stakes at Agincourt or troops laying caltrops, so perhaps similar rules for them could be used. On the other hand, it would pass the initiative to the enemy in game terms. So perhaps a way to handle it is they can either not move, or move straight forward at half speed if the want to shoot and claim the benefit of the spara wall.

I really can’t see this formation being able to move backwards at all.  Once the wall is up, shoot your arrows then pick up your spear and shield seems to be the thing.

The density of the formation is a tricky issue. It’s clear from the width of the spara that these are just as close formation as any combat heavy infantry (Pikes, hoplites, Romans). I would imagine that the reason for this is it allowed concentration of arrows. So they are close order foot. However, lots of rules over the past fifty years have treated archers as “loose formation” and as a concept that is baked fairly deeply into some rule systems. So we could just turn a blind eye and treat them as loose formation.

An alternative would be to treat them as close formation foot or (in systems like MeG flexible foot). Most systems count short spear only at impact, so they’d be good then, but weak against better armoured/weaponed troops in an ongoing melee. However, I can’t really see the spara wall being as effective in bad going. So perhaps they should get no benefit from the spara in rough or difficult going.

 

 

 

Implications for army lists

 

1.       For minor conflicts within a single satrapy, it’s likely that just the locally available troops would be used. However, it is unlikely that these conflicts would be of the scale represented by most wargames rules.

2.       For major conflicts the “Persian style” corps would be the heart of the army. So, compulsory troops in any EAP list should be the sparabara formations “fighting in the Persian style”, but not the Immortals or guard units. At least a third of the troops present should be of this nature, I’d suggest enough compulsories so that players have to take at least three units

3.       How to depict the Sparabara formation? I would say fairly large units (the corps tended to be 10,000 – in theory – all deployed together). So, say, 6-8 bases in MeG. Personally I would have them as formed close order foot but if that’s too much of a departure ‘flexible’ in MeG perhaps. They should have bow and light spear and the spara as a sort of pavise or minor wall.

4.       Immortals. If it’s an army on campaign with the king of Kings, they’d have the full 10,000 Immortals there. But in the context of the Persian army, while it’s good, it’s still just one corps out of thirty. So I would allow only one unit of 6-8. I would suggest allowing the Immortals to substitute for one of the “Persian style” units. i.e. if you had, say 20 compulsort Persian Style bases, allow 6-8 to be upgraded to Immortals. They should be better morale than the other troops though (superior) and were probably better shots too (they were all promoted from the line units so each new recruit into the Immortals would already be highly experienced.

5.       Immortals in a non Royal army. We know very little about these. The army left in Greece to fight Plataea was in effect still a royal army but the KoK had gone home. It seems unlikely they’d have all been sent so maybe 0-6?

6.       Apple bearers . The apple bearers were only a 1000 man unit, so tiny in comparison with the size of the army, and only 10% of the number of the Immortals. Too small to depict in a list I’d say, or perhaps they should be subsumed into the Immortals.

 

Graham Briggs September 2020.

 

 

Comments

  1. As a a non-ancients player trying to learn the period(s), this is an informative article.

    1000 man "regiments" if you will sounds right, as the decimal system or organisation seems to be a common thread throughout the region and well into the 19th century.

    If a 1000 man unit is 10 ranks deep, then presumably it's frontage is quite narrow, in this case 120'. Assuming each rank needs 3 foot minimum to wield his bow, it's gonna be 30' or more deep.
    Do we know how this compares to contemporary armies? Did they only have 4-6-8 deep units?
    Another thought is, if they used spears to tie the shields together to make a barricade, presumably each file would use 3-4 of it's spears to do this, the rearer ranks passing their's forward to use as required. Afterall, they're not needing them whilst they are shooting. And if they are replacing casualties in the ranks in front of them, they'd be able to find a spear underfoot if they didn't have one to hand.

    If the unit is firing, I'd guess only the first 2 ranks would get anything like aimed shots at the target. All the 8 files behind would be overhead shooting presumably trying to hit the rearer areas of approaching enemy units. Whilst not particularly accurate - a unit would have 200 aimed-ish shots and 800 random-ish area fire shots - this is still a lot of shots.

    If the shield bearer is the officer at the front, presumably he's the better man, and could shout fire directions when he's not using his spear or bow. But once in close combat, could the 7 rear files carry on overhead shooting, or would they be pressing up against the front ranks to hold firm, and to fill casualty spaces?

    if the officer is the front ranker, then presumably when the front rank has fallen dead and wounded, the fighting quality of the unit (as apposed to individuals) would then fall by a quotable factor in wargaming terms?

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  2. So if it is like the Phalanx system (big assumption!!) then you would also have a file closer who would be what we might call an officer or NCO. So you would lose some command and control but the loss of front rankers isn't that fatal. Also you have to assume that they'd have thought about this and the 2nd ranker can sort of take over. How well they would do this is clearly an issue. Having said all that your basic assumption is sound as the front ranks suffer casualties unit cohesion would suffer. I think FoG takes this into account nicely with the cohesion test - an element of luck (representing , say, the popular officer leading the unit being killed, the 2nd ranker not taking over effectively, a sudden downpour literally dampening the martial spirit etc etc) plus some things you can do as the commander - provide rear support, have a general nearby etc Also liked your comment re how the rear ranks shoot in practice. I have always been a fan of the "forward observer" theory. Again if a units role was shooting then hours on the parade ground (shooting range!) would be part of their regular routine including how to hit as accurately as possible with those ranks that cannot see the enemy. I am reminded of the late C19th French practice with the Chassepot rifle of rapid fire to create a "beaten zone" through which the enemy has to advance. The trick is when to start shooting and how long to keep it up (given ammo constraints). The enemy then has to pluck up courage to cross that zone.

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  3. Hello, good article - I was doing similar research myself and came to similar overall conclusions, particularly around the fighting formation of the Sparabara.
    It's interesting that the Persians switched from bow and Pavise to javelin and spears with the Takabara - certainly in game terms we don't see an awful lot of difference, but they obviously thought that would be more effective against the Phalanx.

    One question - do you have any idea of the size and number of provincial armies? My thinking is that the Kings army of 50-100k would go wherever needed, sometimes in smaller groups, but that each area of the empire would have a called-up army of maybe 20k troops as well, and could call on levies as needed.
    I'm unsure whether the Persians were professional soldiers though - certainly some would be, the immortals. But everyone else I would have expected to be part time, returning to take in the harvest. Perhaps there was a core of cavalry as well who also were just soldiers.

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    Replies
    1. Thanks for your response Stuart. On the questions you raise:

      - each satrapy had it's own corps of troops - in theory 10,000 men but there is some evidence that some were under strength. Depending on the level of the threat several satrapies could have combined I suppose. But there's little evidence of conflict on this scale until Alexander. In his case the Western satrapies combined. Plus there were Greek mercenaries available.

      The Persians were highly likely to be a full time force. These 100,000 or so weren't farmers they had about 50 million population to do that for them.

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